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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In conclusion, since the new Michigan tax has defined itself in a
much greater extent than the others, a few observations about it would
be well taken. The tax, for instance, exempts the consumer who has
paid a sales tax in the state where the goods were purchased providing
it is equal to the 3% "use" tax; but if it 'be less than 3% he must
pay the difference.
It is an interesting problem to determine how this law will be enforced. How will the State determine the extent of such purchases.
Although the law provides a $10 exemption per month to each consumer, who 'will furnish the information as to the value of his purchases? Although, on paper, the tax does not discriminate between
consumers, yet, in its practicable application, it is difficult to see how
purchases by small consumers will be detected and accounted for. The
Legislature apparently either overlooked this or worded the Statute in
this manner solely to quiet any howl about discrimination by the large
consumers who will be affected by this Statute since it will be almost
impossible for them to smuggle their purchases into the State.
Carl Doozan.

RECENT DECISIONS
ATToRN-Y AND CriNT-BA I
PTEGRATiON
MOVEmMTm.-A committee of lawyers of the Nebraska State Bar Association, appointed to investigate and report
concerning the integration of the bar of the State of Nebraska, made its report to
the Nebraska State Bar Association at its annual meeting in 1936, and the report was approved by the Association. The report provided for its submission
to all members of the bar of the State and for the taking of a referendum by a
vote thereon; and the result of the vote was that 595 members of the bar voted
for bar integration by supreme court rule and 155 against. Thereupon the members of the Committee petitioned the Supreme Court of the State, praying that
the bar of the State be integrated by supreme court rule. The court in a
unanimous opinion, granted the petition. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar

Ass'n, 275 N, W. 265 (Neb. 1937).

Webster defines the word "integrate" as follows: "To form one whole; to
make entire, to complete, to renew; to restore; to perfect." The essence of bar
integration includes three factors: (1) Inclusion in the state bar association of
every practitioner, in the equal contributions to expense of operation, and a form
of organization which insures to every member equal rights in management; (2)
The state bar must possess power to control admission; and (3) The state bar
must possess power to impose discipline. 18 JouNA. op = A .yamcA
JUDIcATURE Soci r

22.

The movement towards bar integration began when the American Judicature
Society drafted a model act. 18 JouRmAL op Tn Ai R x JUnIcATURE Socnzrv
22. This model act became law in California, Nevada, Oklahoma and Arizona. A
more condensed act, framed by the Conference of Delegates, became the model
in Alabama, Idaho and New Mexico. 18 JouRNAL or TE Am cAr JuncAaruRE
SoczETr 22.

RECENT DECISIONS
The various states seeking to integrate their respective bars have proceeded
along three routes: (1) By legislation; (2) Regimentation under supreme court
rules; and (3) A so-called "Third Route to Bar Integration," which consists of
an act of the legislature which declares that the supreme court shall have power
to adopt rules which effect the organization and government of the bar, define
the practice of law, establish rules of conduct and determine the qualifications for
admission. 17 JouiRNA or mn A.marwCA JunIcATuR, SocIrY 124. The third
method is a combination of the first two.
The method of integration sanctioned by the court in the instant case is
one of organization by rules of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, rather than
incorporation through an act of the State Legislature. The Association proposed
is said not to constitute a corporation in any real sense-no board of governors
or officials with power of control over members or over professional conduct
is provided for in the proposal. The Association does not have power to deal
with admission to practice or power to regulate its own functions or power to
limit the privileges of its members. Its disciplinary power is limited to the hearing of complaints and passing them on to the Supreme Court for prosecution,
if the Court decides to take such action, at the expense of the Association. The
Nebraska proposal is designed to eliminate the objectionable features in organizations in other states.
While the passage of the Nebraska act marks a forward step in the movement
towards bar integration such progress has not been easy. The California Act
which has served as a model for other states contains features which have made
its adoption elsewhere difficult. Under the California Act a board of governors
is set up with power to regulate and control the admission of those persons
desiring to be admitted to the bar. Only members of the state bar are permitted to practice in the State. The board of governors operate in a manner
similar to circuit court districts, there being one governor from each district,
each member of the bar being privileged to vote for the governor of his particular
district. Rules of professional conduct are adopted, subject to the approval of
the Supreme Court, with the power in the board ot suspension or disbarment
for wilful breaches of these rules. A hearing is provided for as well as a right
of review. To help in the administration of adopted rules the Board may appoint
local administrative units who investigate complaints in their jurisdiction and
report thereon to the board of governors.
Michigan, in 1935, made an effort to pass an act modeled upon California's
act, only to see the measure defeated by a narrow margin. Michigan subsequently
passed a modified and shortened act, eliminating discussion of the power of the
Legislature to create a corporate bar board by special act by not providing for
any such incorporation. Hugus, An Integrated Bar, 43 W. VA. L. Q. 10.
Kentucky also experienced difficulty in an attempt to put the California plan
into effect. Three attempts by the Kentucky Bar Association were necessary before the Legislature finally, in 1934, passed the act, after vigorous objections by
those opposing it. An attack upon the constitutionality of the Kentucky Act on
the grounds that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to discipline or disbar an attorney, since the State Constitution gave it only appellate jurisdiction
and not original jurisdiction, was not sustained by the Court; it was held that
the Court possessed inherent power to deal with matters relating to attorneys
and that the statute authorizing an original proceeding in the disciplining or disbarring of an attorney gave the court no power which it did not already possess. In Re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93, 101 S. W. (2d) 194 (1937); Commonwealth v.
Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. (2d) 53 (1936). Attorneys are officers of the
court, argued those in opposition to integration as advocated by the Californiainspired Kentucky plan. As officers of the court, they contended, the dignity
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of the Supreme Court could only be upheld by placing in the Court authority to
regulate its attorneys, such regulation being effected by the logical method of
making the rules for such regulation a power of the Court. Even though the
Kentucky Constitution contained no express provision for such regulation, pointed
out the proponents of unconstitutionality, such authority is implied. As precedent,
decisions rendered in Rhode Island, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Virginia were cited.
Another ground of attack centered on the point that the Legislature, in substance
was creating a corporation by special act. It will be noted that this objection
cannot be raised in connection with the Nebraska Act since power of regulation
is left in the Supreme Court of the State.
A third objection raised concerned the deprivation of the lawyer of a constitutional right by granting to a board of governors judicial power to pass
upon admissions and disbarment. Again it should be noted that the Nebraska
Act avoids this objection by not attempting to divorce regulation from the Supreme Court. The distinction, essentially, between the California-Kentucky plan
and the Nebraska Act is that in the former the bar board acts substantially independently of the supreme court, while in the latter the bar board is merely acting
as the agency of the supreme court. The California Act, while basically sound,
had those features mentioned above which made its successful promotion extremely difficult in other states. It was only through the always tedious trial
and error method, as noted in our discussion concerning Kentucky and Michigan, that what has been called for want of a better name "The Missouri Plan"
emerged. The Missouri Plan recognized what the California Plan had not, namely,
that "the essence of integration lay not so much in the power to control admission and impose discipline as in unitary membership and representative government." 20 JoURNAL OFrrn AmymIcAN JUDIcATURE SociETY 202. Bar integration has been not a birth but an evolution following birth. For this reason, to
mark progress towards bar integration from the compilation of the Missouri Plan
is ciearly misleading. As we have seen the Missouri Plan has been merely an
outgrowth of skirmishes which developed a plan of expediency and necessity
culminating in the Act passed by the Missouri Legislature. The Nebraska Act,
in taking advantage of this outgrowth, points the way to successful integration
in other states. That the movement is marching towards definite action is apparent when it is considered that attempts and reattempts are now being made
in the following states: Arkansas, Georgia, Montana, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
Massachusetts and New Jersey. Among those states that have successfully placed
integration acts upon the statute books of their states are Missouri, California,
Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Mississippi, Arizona, North Carolina, Washington, Louisiana, Oregon, New Mexico, and Porto
Rico. 20 JouiuA or THE AmERicAN JUDICATURE SocIETY 202.
John J. Lechner.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF ICE HOCKEY RINK OWNER TO SPECTATOR FOR INJURIESASSUiPTION or RxsK.-Upon payment of admission to defendant's amphitheatre,
plaintiff, who had never seen an ice hockey game before, was seated in the second
row at the side of the rink by defendant's usher. There were wire screens along
the ends of the rink where the goals were, but none where plaintiff was seated,
nor were there any signs warning of the danger of flying pucks. Plaintiff recovered a verdict for damages sustained when she was struck by a puck which was
driven off the playing surface. Held, on appeal, that it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff had assumed the risks incident to the game. The determination of plaintiff's assumption of risk or of the defendant's negligence is for
the jury. Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Corp., 5 N. E. (2d) 1 (Mass. 1936).

RECENT DECISIONS
The instant case is a reassertion of the doctrine that the proprietor of a
public amusement place must provide reasonably safe premises for invitees and
business guests, (3 CooLEY oN TORTS (4th ed.) 188; 3 SmmAw & REnaIw,
LAW Or NEGLIGENcE (6th ed) 704; Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 80 N. W.
117, 81 N. W. 333 (1899) (proprietor of a show owes this duty even to a trespasser whose presence is known as one of a crowd of people)), and a rejection
of the doctrine of the assumption of risk in cases where a spectator at a sporting
event is injured by a flying missile incident to the game itself. Out of the welter
of confused decisions the courts seem to agree that the proprietor need not be
an insurer of the safety of his patrons to the extent of guarding against extraordinary risks which he could not foresee but need merely exercise reasonable care
to make the place as safe as possible taking into account the contrivances necessarily used in the game. Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo..
App. 327, 168 S. W. 908 (1914); Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93,
279 Pac. 277 (1929); King v. Ringling, 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S. W. 482 (1910).
Some courts have held in similar cases that the management has fulfilled its
duty when it provides some screened-in seats, and that, as a matter of law,
where the spectator chooses to sit in an unprotected seat in order to obtain an
unobstructed view of the game, he assumes the risk of injury and is not entitled
to get to the jury. Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App.
301, 153 S. W. 1076 (1913); Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co,.,
16 La. App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931) 1 Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n, 105
Wash. 215, 177 Pac. 776, 181 Pac. 679 (1919) (four-to-three decision upon rehearing reversing decision that question of negligence was for the jury). (However, there
is no such assumption of risk where spectator sitting in an unprotected seat is
injured where several balls are flying about during practice near the stands instead of only one game going on. See CincinnatiBaseball Club v. Eno, 112 Ohio
St. 175, 147 N. E. 86 (1925). Cf. Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement
Co., 16 La. App. 95, 133 So. 408 (1931) (plaintiff assumed risk even from prac-

tice bails)). The management need not provide screened seats for all who might
possibly apply but only for those who it is reasonably anticipated may desire
such protected seats. Brisson v. Minnesota Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn.
507, 240 N. W. 903 (1932).

The doctrine of assumption of risk, first enunciated in Priestly v. Fowler, 3
M. & W. 1, 7 L. J. Ex. 42, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837)

(action by servant against

master), is generally held to be the voluntary acquiescence by plaintiff in the
risk which either was known or should have been known to him at the time of
his injury. 5 C. J. 1412; Murpsy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N. Y. 479,
166 N. E. 173 (1920); Dahna v. Fun House Co., 204 Iowa 922, 216 N. W. 262
(1927); Easier v. Downie Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 Atl. 905 (1926);
Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 80 N. W. 117, 81 N. W. 333 (1899). (However, cf. Conrad v. Springfield Const. R. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 17, 88 N. E. 180 (1909)

(doctrine of assumption of risk still applicable only to cases arising between
master and servant)). In the instant case the defendant knew that pucks sometimes flew over the sidelines barrier, but a spectator who had never before seen
a hockey game would not know this since the puck is generally lifted from the

ice only when making a goal shot. Hence it would seem that the court was correct in not applying the doctrine of assumption of risk, since it is based on
knowledge of the limitations of protection and the existence of such fact ought
to be decided by the jury. Blakeley v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W.
482 (1908). It may have made a difference if plaintiff, during the first few minutes of the game, had seen a puck fly over the sidelines barrier, and thereafter
had had an opportunity to seek a safer seat. In the absence of such fact, the
plaintiff can hardly be said to have assumed the risks of the game since it was
reasonable to suppose that the management in providing these seats nad taken

